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HIDDEN FIGURES: WAGE INEQUITY AND
ECONOMIC INSECURITY FOR BLACK
WOMEN AND OTHER WOMEN OF COLOR
CASSANDRA JONES HAVARD†
Remember the ladies.
—Abigail Adams1
bein alive & bein a woman & bein colored is a metaphysical
dilemma
—ntozake shange2

INTRODUCTION
One hundred years after women secured the right to vote,
wage inequality remains prevalent in the United States. The
gender wage gap, or pay inequity based solely on sex, arguably, is
a measure of the current failure of full and equal participation by
women in American society. The gender wage gap exists despite
federal legislation designed to further wage equality.3 In fact, a
†

Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank
Sam Gagnon for inviting me to participate in the symposium as well as my research
assistants, Christian Coward and Imani Payne, and the student editors of the St.
John’s Law Review. I am grateful for the University of Baltimore School of Law for
funding for this project. For Victoria, Mya, Chelsea, Channing, Zharia, and Emani,
whose race nor sex should never impose wage inequities.
1
Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (March 31, 1776) (on file with the
Massachusetts Historical Society). Abigail Adams is said to have pleaded with her
husband while he was helping draft the Constitution, but John Adams was dismissive
of his wife’s idea, saying men “know better than to repeal our Masculine systems.”
Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (April 14, 1776) (on file with the
Massachusetts Historical Society).
2
NTOZAKE SHANGE, no more love poems # 4, in FOR COLORED GIRLS WHO HAVE
CONSIDERED SUICIDE/WHEN THE RAINBOW IS ENUF 59 (2010).
3
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2006). Title VII prohibits
employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s . . . sex . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§701–718, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§2000e to 2000e-17 (2006)). The job loss experienced by women during the
COVID-19 pandemic furthered the existing gender wage gap. Women lost at least 4.2
million jobs since the beginning of the pandemic. Almost half of that number, or
approximately 2 million, of those women are still unemployed and not expecting to
recover before 2023. See Francesca Chambers, Economic Recovery Could Take Years
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difference as small as two cents over a lifetime costs a woman
approximately $80,000.4 Currently, it is predicted that for a
majority of white women, the pay parity will be attained between
2059–2069.5 However, Black women and other women of color will
not reach pay equity before 2369.6
Most of society is oblivious to the fact that wage inequality is
pervasive for Black women.7 The intersectionality framework
recognized the failure of the law to account for how race and
gender combine to marginalize Black women.8 When combined,

for Women Who Lost Jobs During Pandemic—Even with Biden’s Plans, IWPR (May
27, 2021), https://iwpr.org/media/press-hits/economic-recovery-could-take-years-forwomen-who-lost-jobs-during-pandemic-even-with-bidens-plans/
[https://perma.cc/55RT-R9QM]. Women also disproportionately lost or were forced to
leave their jobs, which in turn means they missed out on promotions which affects
their wealth accumulation. See Kai Ryssdal & Andie Corban, Sallie Krawcheck, On
What The Pandemic Means For Women’s Finances, MARKETPLACE (July 27, 2021),
https://www.marketplace.org/2021/07/27/sallie-krawcheck-on-what-the-pandemicmeans-for-womens-finances/ [https://perma.cc/4YF4-T9UR].
4
See The State of the Gender Pay Gap in 2021, PAYSCALE (Mar. 2021),
https://www.payscale.com/data/gender-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/Z3JV-WLZ7]. A
PayScale report compiled from 1.8 million women between 2017 and 2019 shows that
“[w]omen in the controlled group make $0.98 for every $1.00 a man makes.” Id.
5
See Valerie Lacarte & Jeff Hayes, Women’s Median Earnings as a Percent of
Men’s, 1985-2019 (Full-time, Year-Round Workers) with Projections for Pay Equity, by
Race/Ethnicity, IWPR (Sept. 28, 2020), https://iwpr.org/iwpr-publications/quickfigure/pay-equity-projection-race-ethnicity-2020/ [https://perma.cc/DY4P-SPP5];
Race and the Pay Gap, AAUW, https://www.aauw.org/resources/research/race-andthe-pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/7WW9-S7QK] (last visited July 28, 2022).
6
Race and the Pay Gap, AAUW, supra note 5. According to the AAUW study,
Black women earned 63% of what white men earned, which would maintain a wage
gap for Black women until 2369. Id. The gap is predicted to close in 2041 for Asian
women and 2451 for Latina women. Id.
7
See The Pay Gap is the Tip of the Iceberg for Black Women, CISION PR NEWSWIRE
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-pay-gap-is-the-tip-ofthe-iceberg-for-black-women-300905708.html [https://perma.cc/CH5Z-247H]. The
recent survey indicates that 53% of Americans are unaware of the pay disparities that
Black women face or the barriers to career advancement compared to white women.
Id. According to the 2020 Hired Survey, 33% of men are either uncertain of or deny
the existence of a gender wage gap, compared to 16% of women. The 2020 State of
Wage Inequality in the Workplace, HIRED.COM, https://hired.com/h/wage-inequalityreport#intro [https://perma.cc/YD2N-BWAV] (last visited July 30, 2022).
8
Intersectionality studies how structures of domination combine to marginalize
Black women. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1296–97 (1991)
(“[U]nveil[ing] the processes of subordination and the various ways those processes
are experienced by people who are subordinated and people who are privileged by
them.”). Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins, whose work on the intersection of race and
gender was instrumental in establishing black feminism as an academic discipline, is
also worth noting here. See generally PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST
THOUGHT (1990).
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racial and gender discrimination lead to economic, social, and
political ramifications, any and all of which impact Black women
differently.9
As presently enacted, neither of the two federal statutes that
prohibit gender pay inequities—the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)—adequately
address the racialized wage gender gap. Nor do they differentiate
the extent of the discrimination that Black women and other
women of color experience based on their multiple identities of
gender and race. Most importantly, neither corrects the market
imperfections that sustain racialized gender inequality. Law has
failed to expose and sufficiently regulate the structural and
systemic bias that sustains racialized gendered marginalization
and socio-economic inequalities.10 The central question is: what
allows this systemic inequity to self-perpetuate?
Identifying the interconnected structures of domination that
are continuously replicated is central to disarming them.11 A
critical analysis confirms how neoliberal economic assumptions
9
The wage gap for Black women is 61% less than white men. See Mark Paul,
Darrick Hamilton & William Darity Jr., Discriminatory Penalties at the Intersection
of Race and Gender in the United States, WASH. CTR. EQUITABLE GROWTH (Aug. 7,
2018),
https://equitablegrowth.org/discriminatory-penalties-at-the-intersection-ofrace-and-gender-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/6WAG-YCF5]. Using identity
intersections to perform an economic analysis of discrimination, researchers
concluded that failing to disaggregate the penalties associated with two or more
socially marginalized identities misstates the complexity of employment
discrimination. Id.
10
See infra Part I.
11
The maturation of intersectionality as a legal theory requires expanding beyond
identifying just race and gender, or the multiple identifiers in which discrimination is
experienced, to an analysis of the inter-connectedness of domination structures.
Jennifer C. Nash, ‘Home Truths’ on Intersectionality, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 445,
469–70 (2011). Nash posits that a “rigorous re-thinking” uncouples Black feminism
and intersectionality to expand theoretical explorations in at least three ways: (1)
analyzing the particular situational contexts of race and gender to determine when
intersections are rigid as opposed to fluid; (2) understanding the conditions under
which race and gender intersect and may or may not “bolster[ ] and reproduce[ ]” other
structures of domination; and (3) establishing which social processes that connect
structures of domination and allow those connections to “originate and replicate”
themselves. Id. Professor Terri McMurtry-Chubb concludes that the term has become
“rhetorical shorthand to express interlocking identities when discussing claims of
discrimination and marginalization.” Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, There Are No
Outsiders Here: Rethinking Intersectionality as Hegemonic Discourse in the Age of
#Metoo, 16 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 1, 32 (2019). McMurtry-Chubb argues that
“continu[ing] this discourse in ways that both define and solidify difference does little
to address the nuances of white supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalism as they operate
in the descriptors ‘race,’ ‘class,’ ‘gender,’ ‘sexuality,’ and ‘sexual orientation.’ ” Id. at
15.
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embedded within legal doctrine and gendered racial subordination
essentialize the racialized wage gap. Specifically, the legal rules
either implicitly or explicitly embed neoclassical economic
principles allowing the inequitable compensation schemes to go
unchecked. Consequently, in this context, law and economic
theory coalesce to become a structural barrier to economic
equality.
Part I introduces the theory of intersectionality and provides
a summary of the existing pay equity statutes. An examination of
the empirical data on the racialized gender wage gap makes a
strong argument for why race and gender cannot be viewed in
isolation when assessing bias and legally defined discrimination.12
Part I also briefly reviews case law surrounding the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII to show the particular inadequacy of the rules
designed to ensure pay equality.
Part II discusses the structural barriers that create and
perpetuate the racialized wage gap.13 The Part begins with an
examination of neoclassical economic principles and how the
assumptions underlying them contribute to discrimination and
structures of oppression and privilege. The discussion then turns
to the structural barrier of political invisibility and lays the
foundation for tackling the racialized gender gap by discussing the
social contract among a society’s citizens. This discussion begs the
question of why the policies on wage equality are not more
protective of Black women and other women of color from this type
of discrimination. Finally, this Part examines the negative effect
that racial stereotypes and tropes have had on limiting the
economic opportunities and jeopardizing the economic security for
Black women and other women of color.
Part III begins with the acknowledgement that, to address the
racialized gender gap, the perspective of the least privileged must
be included within relevant policies and strategies. This Part also
addresses the concerns of those who are more advantaged yet
without the same risk of some segments being left behind.14 It
12
Elizabeth R. Cole, Intersectionality and Research in Psychology, 64 AM. PSYCH.
170, 178 (2009).
13
See Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a Law-and-Political-Economy
Framework: Beyond The Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1827–30
(2020) (advocating that laws and policies in a structurally reformed political economy
replaces an over-reliance on neoliberal economic principles with an apolitical
framework that balances power, equality, and democracy).
14
See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987); Nancy Chi Cantalupo, And
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identifies ways to address the de-constructed structural biases
embedded in the anti-discrimination statutes and case law. The
proposed reforms are preliminary efforts to change the law and
policy, and ultimately employer behavior, so that all employees,
but especially Black women and other women of color, are
guaranteed an economically equitable workplace.
I. THE RACIALIZED WAGE GAP
A.

Defining Intersectionality

Gender oppression has always been dominant in American
society. Tasks and responsibilities involving the home—often
referred to as “women’s work”—were not equally valued as the
work that men performed because men were the designated
breadwinners. This imbalance in the power structure gave rise to
feminism, which critiques and acknowledges the bias that women
encounter in power structures.15 Yet, feminist theory has not
always understood or acknowledged the ways in which Black
women experience bias in power structures.16 As one author
argues, white middle-class Western feminists articulated a view of
gender that privileged themselves while marginalizing others.17
Feminism, as originally presented, simply provided another form
of oppression for Black women.18

Even More of Us Are Brave: Intersectionality and Sexual Harassment of Women
Students of Color, 42 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 66 (2019); Kimberlé Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139, 167 (“It is somewhat ironic that those concerned with alleviating the
ills of racism and sexism should adopt such a top-down approach to discrimination. If
their efforts instead began with addressing the needs and problems of those who are
most disadvantaged and with restructuring and remaking the world where necessary,
then others who are singularly disadvantaged would also benefit.”).
15
BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGINS TO CENTER 26 (1984)
(“Feminism is the struggle to end sexist oppression.”).
16
Id. at 1–3.
17
See generally ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1990).
18
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L.J. 581, 588-89, 615 (1990) (arguing that contrary to Western middle-class feminist
views of gender as based on men’s sexual desires, variations among backgrounds and
culture dictates and defines gender for different groups of women); see also Alison
Stone, Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy, 1 J. MORAL PHIL.
135, 151 (2004) (critiquing feminist essentialism and universality by arguing that
culture defines identity as female).
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Intersectionality theory is a response to the complexity of race
and gender and intersectionality addresses the oppression that
Black women face in the American legal and political system.19
The crux of intersectionality is eliminating hierarchies and
dismantling structural inequities. 20 Specifically, intersectionality
posits that Black women are discriminated against in ways that
cannot solely be placed within the legal categories of
racism or sexism.21
Intersectionality thoery acknowledges the difficulty of
discriminatory conduct that is multidimensional and complex. It
also encapsulates the full identity of Black women’s experiences
giving equal weight to the effect of race and gender in
discrimination claims.
As an advocacy tool, intersectionality
aligns the interests of different groups that are resisting the status
quo. Instead of requiring Black women plaintiffs to make a choice
on immutable characteristics, intersectionality theory melds the
multiple forms of inequality and identity to show their interconnectedness.22

19

Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 149.
Pauli Murray is credited with ensuring that the concept of intersectionality was
included in the Civil Rights Act. See Serena Mayeri, After Suffrage: The Unfinished
Business of Feminist Legal Advocacy, 129 YALE L.J. F. 512, 512 (2020). She saw the
uniqueness of the women’s liberation movement and the civil rights movement and
the need to combine the interest as an advantage for the Black woman. Id. Murray
wrote: “ ‘The Negro woman can no longer postpone or subordinate the fight against
discrimination because of sex to the civil rights struggle but must carry on both fights
simultaneously,’ because women’s ‘full participation and leadership’ was ‘necessary
to the success of the civil rights revolution.’ ” Id. at 519 (quoting Pauli Murray, “The
Negro Woman in the Quest for Equality,” speech to the National Council of Negro
Women Convention (Nov. 14, 1963)).
21
Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 150. Crenshaw explained:
I am suggesting that Black women can experience discrimination in ways
that are both similar to and different from those experienced by white women
and Black men. Black women sometimes experience discrimination in ways
similar to white women’s experiences; sometimes they share very similar
experiences with Black men. Yet often they experience doublediscrimination—the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the
basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And sometimes, they experience
discrimination as Black women—not the sum of race and sex discrimination,
but as Black women.
Id. at 149.
22
Critical Race scholar Richard Delgado warned against the fragmentation that
intersectionality can create. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Reconsideration:
Intersectionality and the Future of Critical Race Theory, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1247, 1264
(2011) (“[I]ntersectionality can easily paralyze progressive work and thought because
of the realization that whatever unit you choose to work with, someone may come
along and point out that you forgot something.”).
20
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Yet, addressing racism and its obvious and latent policies and
practices requires comprehension of additional axes of oppression
at separate times and in various contexts. An inclusive feminism
acknowledges the subjectivity of the experiences of Black women
and other women of color rather than marginalizing them. Failing
to deconstruct the impact of racism, classism, and discrimination
in policies perpetuates inequality and justifies the exclusion of
those who are affected.23
The challenge of intersectionality theory as a tool of reform is
its haphazard development. As an offshoot of critical race theory
(“CRT”), perhaps the most justified critique is intersectionality has
not adequately identified or analyzed the particular oppressive
structures that result in subordination of Black women.24 In this
regard, the concept has been reduced to a word that is both
misunderstood and misused. One author argues, the theory does
not fulfill its promise as “a transformative model for addressing
patterns of domination in historical, cultural, political, and social
context.”25 Further, as will be discussed in Section I.D., courts
have not readily embraced the concept.
B.

The Existing Laws

Two specific statutes mandate pay equity, the Equal Pay Act
(“EPA”)26 and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”).27
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
enforces both statutes.28 The EPA prohibits differential pay based

23
See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE xii
(1989); MAXWELL CONSTANTINE CHANDO MUSINGAFI ET AL., PHILOSOPHIZING
EXPERIENCES AND VISION OF THE FEMALE BODY, MIND, AND SOUL HISTORICAL
CONTEXT AND CONTEMPORARY THEORY 24 (2021) (“[O]bjectification cannot serve as
the common condition for womanhood since it varies considerably depending on one’s
race and class.”).
24
Kate Sablosky Elengold, Clustered Bias, 96 N.C. L. REV. 457, 483–86 (2018)
(proposing that intersectionality becomes a more credible theory by identifying the
structural inequities that produce the intersecting discrimination).
25
McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 11, at 37.
26
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1963). The Equal Pay Act of 1963
amended the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Id.
27
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). It also prohibits
employment discrimination based on “color, religion, . . . and national origin.” Id.
28
See Overview, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/overview [https://perma.cc/3WPHMUF8] (last visited July 30, 2022). An employee filing a timely claim under Title VII
alleging discrimination by an employer must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days
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on gender by monitoring the pay differentials between men and
women, working in the same establishment, performing jobs that
require “substantially equal skill, effort and responsibility under
similar working conditions.”29
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment, including
hiring and compensation, based on race or sex.30 This Section
focuses on the history and intent behind both statutes. Neither
statute as presently configured ameliorates sex- and race-based
discrimination. As argued below, to turn a blind eye to the
political and legal principles that foster discrimination and create
unjust economic conditions for Black women and other women of
color is inconsistent with the purpose of laws intended to prohibit
gender discrimination.
1.

Equal Pay Act of 1963

The United States first recognized the gender wage gap as
problematic during World War I. During World War I, the
National War Labor Board regulated wartime wages by requiring
equal pay for equal work.31 Attempts to regulate the gender wage

of the violation. See Time Limits for Filing a Charge, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/time-limits-filing-charge [https://perma.cc/5X4C-4HGN] (last
visited July 30, 2022). In 2012, the EEOC published a Strategic Enforcement Plan.
See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN:
FISCAL YEARS 2017–2021 (2017), https://www.eeoc.gov/us-equal-employmentopportunity-commission-strategic-enforcement-plan-fiscal-years-2017-2021
[https://perma.cc/ZYH3-W4KV]. The EEOC stated, “[t]he Commission continues to
focus on gender-based pay discrimination. In addition, in recognition of the pay
disparities that persist based on race, ethnicity, and for individuals with disabilities
and other protected groups, the Commission extends its equal pay priority to explicitly
reach all workers.” Id.
29
The Equal Pay Act of 1963, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/equal-payact-1963 [https://perma.cc/4UD6-86DM] (last visited July 20, 2022); see also Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1963).
30
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII’s employment discrimination prohibitions
include “color, religion, . . . and national origin.” Id.
31
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 0Q7 NO. LOI, LABOR AS
AFFECTED BY THE WAR (1921) (“That in all cases where women do the same work as
men they shall receive equal pay for equal work.”). During World War II, the National
War Labor Board “issued a ruling establishing the principle of equal pay for equal
work.” Marguerite J. Fisher, Equal Pay for Equal Work, 2 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. REV.
50, 51 (1948). Although the United States refused to adopt it, the International Labor
Organization ratified the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100) in 1951,
representing an international consensus on pay equity. See Equal Remuneration for
LAB.
ORG.,
Work
of
Equal
Value,
INT’L
https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/wages/minimum-wages/rates/WCMS_433906/lang—
en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9G69-LUGL] (last visited July 30, 2022); Up-to-date
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gap continued after World War I and World War II, and in 1962
Congress began considering wage equity on the federal level.
In 1945, Congress introduced the Women’s Equal Pay Act.32
This initial proposal mandated equal pay for “comparable quality
and quantity” of work.33 However, Congress rejected this approach
reasoning that enforcement of the proposed standard would
become burdensome.34 Accordingly, the standard became “equal
pay for equal work.”35 For years, critics of the EPA have justified
the gender wage gap as an old wives’ tale. Simply put, many critics
deny the gender pay gap exists: “The gap isn’t real, because after
adjusting for the different types of jobs that men and women tend
to have, the gap shrinks to single digits.”36 Men and women are
paid differently because they choose to go into different
professions; unequal work, thus unequal pay.37 This type of
reasoning allowed private industry to use subjective job
classifications and position evaluations to maintain wage
differentials.
The EPA’s legislative history makes clear the congressional
intent was to eliminate pay disparities between men and women,
and thus eradicate economic inequalities.38
Although the
employee bears the burden of proof to establish a wage differential,

Conventions and Protocols not ratified by the United States of America, INT’L LAB.
ORG., https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11210:0::NO:
:P11210_COUNTRY_ID:102871 [https://perma.cc/3UZ2-5FHJ] (last visited July 30,
2022).
32
Equal Pay, HISTORY (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/womensrights/equal-pay-act [https://perma.cc/CS2K-EYUJ].
33
Id.
34
In expressing his support for the bill, Representative Goodell of New York
explained, “[w]e do not expect the Labor Department people to go into an
establishment and attempt to rate jobs that are not equal.” 109 CONG. REC. 9197
(1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell).
35
See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 190, 205 (1974) (deciding
whether it was a violation of the EPA for an employer to pay male inspectors more
than female inspectors doing the same job).
36
Bourree Lam, What Gender Pay-Gap Statistics Aren’t Capturing, ATLANTIC (July 27,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/paygap-discrimination/
492965/ [https://perma.cc/8E2Q-BJAZ].
37
Id.
38
The EPA provides,
No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of
sex . . . except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other
factor other than sex.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
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discriminatory intent on the part of the employer is not required.39
Meeting the burden only requires the employee to identify a
similarly situated male employee, who performs “substantially
equal” work.40 The burden then shifts to the employer to “show
that the factor of sex provided no basis for the wage differential.”41
It is unambiguous that the statute is remedial and imposes
strict liability on employers.42 By requiring clarity in the criteria
of seniority, merit, and productivity, employers can put forth
affirmative defenses that justify the wage differentials.43 It is less
clear if the statutory intent is followed when an employer’s
justification for a wage differential falls under the catchall
affirmative defense.44 The catchall affirmative defense—based on
“any other factor other than sex”—has been interpreted by courts
to allow an employer to use evidence of ambiguous factors—for
example, prior salary, worth, flexibility, and future potential.45
This rationale seems at best an indirect way for an employer to
use “sex-related” factors to justify discriminatory wages.46
Although an employee can present a prima facie case by showing
the salary differences, the employer can defend by providing a
rationale that is not based on prohibited criteria. The employee
must then prove that the stated reason is merely a pretext for a
decision based on prohibited criteria.47 Some circuits have

39

Id.; Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195–97.
Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 204 n.24. The EPA plaintiff has the burden
of establishing a prima facie case, which requires showing: (1) “an employer pays
different wages to employees of opposite sexes”; (2) “for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility”; and (3) “which
are performed under similar working conditions.” Id. at 195.
41
Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Mulhall v. Advance
Sec., Inc. 19 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1994)).
42
Referring to the EPA, the Supreme Court of the United States in Corning Glass
Works described the statute as “broadly remedial . . . it should be construed and
applied so as to fulfill the underlying purposes which Congress sought to achieve.” 417
U.S. at 208.
43
29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
44
See 109 CONG. REC. 1963 at 9210 (statement of Rep. Goodell) (noting that it
would be “impossible to list each and every exception”).
45
29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1); County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169–70
(1981); see infra note 48.
46
Currently there is a split among the circuits on whether an employer can use
prior salary as an other-than-sex-related factor under the EPA. See infra notes 47–54
and accompanying text.
47
See Keziah v. W.M. Brown & Son, Inc., 888 F.2d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 1989) (“One
of the things undermining the company’s defense is the pure subjectivity of the salarysetting process. The salaries were based on nothing more than [a] subjective
evaluation of [the employees’] worth.”).
40
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permitted the “factor other than sex” defense to apply only if prior
salary is not the only basis of the affirmative defense.48
2.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII’s prohibition against gender discrimination has a
sordid history. The “sex amendment” was intended to ensure that
proposed legislation prohibiting race discrimination would never
become law.49 Instead, prohibiting gender discrimination gained
broader support, as feminists advocated for prohibiting their
unequal treatment under law as well.
Title VII has broad remedial powers. Disparate impact is
where a facially neutral employment policy has the effect without
the intent of discrimination against a protected group of
employees, whereas disparate treatment is intentional
employment discrimination.50 Thus, the key difference between
treatment and impact, is that a disparate impact claim does not
require intent.51 The Supreme Court of the United States
articulated disparate impact in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., where
the Court determined that Title VII prohibits “not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation.”52 Further, the Court stated, “[t]he
touchstone is business necessity.”53 Thus, if the employer could
not show that the neutral employment practice is related to the

48
See Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1570–71 (11th Cir. 1988)
(prior salary alone cannot justify a pay disparity but may be combined with unique
characteristics of the same job; the “individual’s experience, training, or ability; or
from special exigent circumstances connected with the business”) (emphasis added);
see also Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955–57 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
employers may use evidence of prior salary history if there is a “mixed-motive, such
as prior pay and more experience”); Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1198–99
(10th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he EPA ‘precludes an employer from relying solely upon a prior
salary to justify pay disparity.’ ”) (quoting Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 70 Fed.
Appx. 500, 508 (10th Cir. 2003)).
49
There was a genuine concern even among feminists that adding sex
discrimination to the civil rights legislation would torpedo the legislation’s passage.
See 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964) (statement of Edith Green) (“[L]et us not add any
amendment that would place in jeopardy in any way our primary objective of ending
that discrimination that is most serious, most urgent, most tragic, and most
widespread against the Negroes of our country.”).
50
Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment:
Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 96, 104 (2006).
51
Id. at 99 (“For this reason, disparate impact has been likened to a negligence
theory in claims of discrimination.”) (footnote omitted).
52
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
53
Id.
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job and job performance, the practice is prohibited.54 However,
because disparate impact is a “creature of case law,” the Court has
been able to chip away at its protections.55
Disparate treatment is completely different than disparate
impact because disparate treatment is premised on intentional
employment discrimination.
Importantly, the burden of
persuasion as to whether the employer intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains with the plaintiff throughout the
trial.56 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court
set out the elements of a prima facie case:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open, and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant’s qualifications.57

After the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the defendant employer to show that there was a
nondiscriminatory and legitimate reason.58 If the defendant
satisfies this, the plaintiff must show that the employer’s action
was simply a pretext for intentional discrimination.59
Until 1980, a Title VII gender-based wage discrimination
claim required the EPA’s “equal pay for equal work” standard. For
women claiming wage discrimination, this requirement severely
limited the available remedies under Title VII because men
predominately held high-paying jobs and positions.60 However,
after Washington County v. Gunther, the “equal work” criteria was
no longer a bar for women challenging wage disparity.61 Yet,

54

Id.
Seiner, supra note 50, at 101.
56
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
57
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (footnote omitted).
Notably, the Court stated, “[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the
specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.” Id. at 802 n.13.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 798.
60
Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 202 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
61
As a result of Gunther, the requirements for a prima facie case under the Equal
Pay Act no longer restrict Title VII actions. Id. at 180–81.
55
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Gunther left open questions as to proving sex-based wage
discrimination under the disparate impact framework as well.62
[T]he Supreme Court held that the Bennett Amendment
incorporates into Title VII the four affirmative defenses of the
Equal Pay Act, but not the unequal pay for equal work
requirement. Treating the case as one of disparate treatment,
the Court did not discuss whether the Bennett Amendment
precludes all disparate impact claims of sex-based wage
discrimination. The Court also declined to address whether
unequal pay for jobs of “comparable worth” violates Title VII.63

One of the problems with anti-discrimination law regarding
equal pay is the individualized nature of the discrimination claim.
To avoid wide-spread liability, there must be a causal connection
between the employer an employee. Industry-wide studies show
the prevalence of discrimination along gender, racial and ethnic
lines.
However, these studies cannot be used to bring a
discrimination case unless the studies can show a specific
employer paid a Black woman or a woman of color less because of
sex or race. Examining the data on the distribution of wage
inequality among different groups is helpful in assessing areas of
reform.
C.

The Political Economy of the Gender Pay Gap

Economic security is a measure of a person’s financial
position, the ability to earn income, and to build and maintain
wealth. Increased enforcement of equal pay laws is a workplace
protection that women need.64 Examining the overlay of race and
gender shows the relationship between equal pay and economic
security. Out of the 38.1 million people living in poverty, 21.4
million of them are women.65 Black women experience poverty
about twice as much as white women.66 The wage gap is
exacerbated through its effect on women’s retirement income.

62

Mark B. Seidenfeld, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under the Title VII
Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1982).
63
Id. (footnote omitted).
64
Additional workplace protections for women include flexibility for pregnant
women and nursing mothers and expanding employment opportunities for women in
high-wage, high-demand occupations.
65
ROBIN BLEIWEIS ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE BASIC FACTS ABOUT WOMEN
IN POVERTY 1 (Aug. 3, 2020), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2020/08/
07060425/Women-In-Poverty-UPDATE.pdf?_ga=2.188258216.1019663776.16278471041733293776.1625491108 [https://perma.cc/34X2-UA2H].
66
Id. at 2–3.
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“Women’s lifetime earnings exert a large impact on their level of
retirement security, as they determine Social Security benefits,
DB pension income, and savings . . . .”67 Women, age 65 and older,
are 80% more likely to be impoverished in retirement than men.68
Further, “women between the ages of 75 [and] 79 are three times
more likely than men to be living in poverty.”69
The wage gap is closing, but for Black women that progress is
limited. The most significant improvement has been for white and
Asian women. Over the last 30 years, Asian women’s earnings
ratio changed from 69% to 87%—an 18% difference; the Asian
women’s wage gap is expected to close by 2041.70 Similarly, white
women’s earnings ratio changed from 64% to 79%—a 15%
difference; the white women’s wage gap is projected to close by
2069.71
The changes in the racialized wage gap are more limited for
Black women and other women of color. For Black women, there
was a 4% improvement in the ratio, up to 63% from 59%.72 For
Latina women, the earnings ratio increased only by 2%, up to 55%
from 53%.73 Given these current ratios, Black women can expect
the gap to close in 2369, or in 350 years, and Latina women can
expect their gap to close in 2541, which is in 432 years.74 Black
women’s median annual earnings are less than white men’s in
every state in the country.75 “Black women’s lower earnings are
due to numerous systemic inequalities, including discrimination
in recruitment and promotion, the undervaluation of work in
occupations where many Black women work, and their
underrepresentation in the jobs that pay most.”76 Evidence of
industry-wide discrimination against women of color is

67
JENNIFER BROWN ET AL., NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., SHORTCHANGED IN
RETIREMENT CONTINUING CHALLENGES TO WOMEN’S FINANCIAL FUTURE 2 (March
2016), https://www.nirsonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/final_shortchanged_
retirement_report_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL6E-986X].
68
Id. at 1.
69
Id.
70
Race and the Pay Gap, AAUW, supra note 5.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
ARIAN HEGEWISCH & CHANDRA CHILDERS, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y REPORT
(IWPR), BLACK WOMEN TO REACH EQUAL PAY WITH WHITE MEN IN 2130, IWPR
#Q086, at 2 (August 2020), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/BlackWomen-Equal-Pay-Day-Policy-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/NXW7-7Q2P].
76
Id.
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compelling. Even when women of color have greater educational
attainment than white men, women of color are paid less.
While the wage gap decreased for white women as education
level increased, higher education does not make a significant
difference in earnings for women of color. Black women who
graduated high school earned 65.99% of what similarly educated
white, non-Hispanic men earned.77 When they completed a
bachelor’s degree, that earnings ratio dropped to 65.14%.78 Latina
women who graduated high school earned 66.78% of what white,
non-Hispanic male high school graduates earned—a number that
dropped to 62.73% upon graduating with their bachelor’s degree.79
“Native American women who earned a high school diploma
earned 66.7% of what their white, non-Hispanic male counterparts
earned,” but decreased to 59.2% for Native American women with
a bachelor’s degree.80
Finally, although the wage gap for Asian women appears less
significant, the best indicator is a woman’s country of origin.81 The
wage gap is non-existent or relatively insignificant for women who
report Indian or Chinese ethnicity or ancestry.82 But women who
identify as Filipina, Vietnamese, and Korean are paid much less.83
Moreover, the “model minority myth” tends to ignore the
discrimination these women encounter as an ethnic subgroup.84

77

Race and the Pay Gap, AAUX, supra note 5.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
NATI’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES, ASIAN AMERICAN AND PACIFIC
ISLANDER
WOMEN
AND
THE
WAGE
GAP
1
(Mar.
2021),
https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/fairpay/asian-women-and-the-wage-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK54-KHSZ].
82
Id. at 4.
83
Id. at 2.
84
See Tami Abdollah & Trevor Hughes, Hate Crimes Against Asian Americans are on
the Rise. Here’s What Activists, Lawmakers and Police are doing to stop the violence,
USATODAY (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/02/27/
asian-hate-crimes-attacks-fueled-covid-19-racism-threaten-asians/4566376001/
[https://perma.cc/2U7L-DHV3]; Suzanne Nuyen, Anti-Asian Attacks Rise During
Pandemic. Read NPR’s Stories On The Surge In Violence, NPR (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/17/978055571/anti-asian-attacks-rise-during-pandemicread-nprs-stories-on-the-surge-in-violen [https://perma.cc/XC4X-FYPV]; Vivian Ho, Asian
Americans Reported 3,800 Hate-Related Incidents During the Pandemic, Report Finds,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/mar/16/asianamericans-hate-incidents-pandemic-study [https://perma.cc/5LTM-G8QK].
78
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D. The Inadequacy of Existing Laws
The EPA differs from Title VII in three key respects. First, the
EPA is limited to wage discrimination based on sex when male and
female coworkers in the same workplace are paid differently.85
Second, unlike Title VII, which can only be enforced if the
employer has fifteen or more employees, the EPA applies to any
employer.86 Third, the claims process under Title VII requires a
plaintiff to file a claim with the EEOC for review before the
institution of a lawsuit.87 What follows is a brief look at how the
case law has developed under the EPA and Title VII, which will
provide a better understanding of why the law and accompanying
regulations should become uniformly consistent in prohibiting
discrimination against Black women and other women of color
employees.
1.

Equal Pay Act of 1963

Congress intended the Equal Pay Act to remedy the severe,
widespread problem of employment discrimination in private
industry. When the statute was passed in 1963, the myth of male
superiority was still prevalent.88 Thus, to uncover discrimination
it was necessary to require employers to justify any decision to not
pay equally for equal work. The loophole in the EPA is the causal
connection needed between the male comparator salary and the
“factor other than sex” defense.89

85

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).
Coverage of Business/Private Employers, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers
/coverage_private.cfm [https://perma.cc/6KRJ-UD8C] (last visited June 23, 2022); see also
Know Your Rights: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, AAUW,
https://www.aauw.org/what-we-do/legal-resources/know-your-rights-at-work/title-vii/
[https://perma.cc/5L6D-MEKW] (last visited June 23, 2022).
87
The EPA statute of limitations is longer. A plaintiff may bring a claim within
two years of receipt of the last discriminatory paycheck. Coverage of Business/Private
Employers, supra note 86. With Title VII claims, the complainant has at least 180
days from the time the discrimination occurred to file a charge and 90 days to file a
lawsuit after receiving a Notice of Right to Sue. Know Your Rights: Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 86.
88
At that time, throughout the private employment sector, there was the
outdated belief that a man, because of his role in society, should be paid more than a
woman although his duties were the same. Undoubtedly, this belief remains.
89
The Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R.7) was reintroduced in the House of
Representatives on January 28, 2021, by Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT). Originally
introduced on January 9, 2009, and passed by the House of Representatives, it would
close the loophole in the EPA that allows employers to us the “factor other than sex”
as an affirmative defense. Unfortunately, the Paycheck Fairness Act does not alter
86

2021]

HIDDEN FIGURES

657

Unlike Title VII’s business necessity defense, the EPA’s
“factor other than sex” defense is, by definition, a broad, ill-defined
justification.90 Under the comparable Title VII “business
necessity” standard, an employer must demonstrate that a
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity. Further, under Title VII, the employer
bears the burden of showing that the rejected alternative
employment practice would both have a less disparate impact and
satisfy its legitimate business interest.
Pursuant to the EPA, after the plaintiff presents a prima facie
case that a comparable male employee makes more money for
performing equal work—doing jobs that require equal skill, effort,
and responsibility—the employer can justify the wage disparity
using one of four affirmative defenses.91 An employer may justify
such conduct if it set wages pursuant to: “(i) a seniority system; (ii)
a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings, quantity
or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other
Although the “factor other than sex”
factor other than sex.”92
defense does not fall into one of the enumerated
defenses⎯seniority, merit, or quantity of production⎯it should be
interpreted consistently with the Equal Pay Act’s goal of rooting
out pay discrimination. Yet, unlike in the following cases where
the “factor other than sex” is properly interpreted, the standard is
often misapplied.
In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, the Supreme Court
rejected a neoclassical economics argument that “market
economics” can constitute a “factor other than sex.”93 The
defendant, Corning Glass Works (“Corning”), argued that the
market value of men’s labor for the position determined the higher
salaries for men’s work over women’s.94 Men, who historically
made up the workforce and who had greater bargaining power,
received a higher salary.95

the safeguards embedded in the Equal Pay Act that ensure that employers exercise
appropriate discretion in setting compensation in nondiscriminatory ways.
90
Id.
91
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
92
Id.
93
417 U.S. 188, 207-08 (1974).
94
Id. at 205–08.
95
Id. at 204–06. See also Siler-Khodr v. Univ. of Texas Health Science Ctr., 261
F.3d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (“This Court has previously stated
that the University’s market forces argument is not tenable and simply perpetuates
the discrimination that Congress wanted to alleviate when it enacted the EPA.”).
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Corning instituted a night shift inspector position at a time
when New York and Pennsylvania prohibited female employees
from working at night.96 To recruit male employees to these
inspector positions, Corning paid male employees more than the
dayshift, female employees.97
Corning argued that male
employees would not perform inspection work unless they received
more money than the daytime female inspectors; in other words,
that the pay differential was not based on sex, it was based on
their need to accommodate the male night shift workers.98 The
Court rejected Corning’s argument reasoning that the company’s
decisions to pay women less for the same work men performed
“took advantage” of the market and was illegal under the Equal
Pay Act.99
Under Corning Glass Works, courts should require employers
using the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense to evaluate
whether an employer’s assertion of more experience or better
credentials are necessary for the position. This is to ensure that
the prior salary earned by a male comparator is not itself the
product of sex discrimination or a residual effect of the
traditionally enhanced value attached to work performed by men.
Several circuit courts have followed Corning. In Belfi v.
Pendergrast, the employer refused to increase the salary of a
female railroad office engineer to equal that of male office
engineers alleging that it was applying a gender-neutral salary
plan.100 The Second Circuit correctly required that the employer
prove that its established policy was not connected to the genderbased discrimination.101 Keziah v. W.M. Brown & Son, Inc.,
involved a salary differential based on the male comparator's
“experience and customer base.”102 The Fourth Circuit held that
the absence of salary guidelines or concrete standards for
determining salary resulted in purely subjective salary

96

Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 191–92.
Id. at 191 n.3. Many men viewed the inspector position, which had historically
been a day position composed of only women, as inferior “women’s work.” Id.
98
Id. at 197, 204.
99
Id. at 205.
100
191 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999).
101
Id. at 139 (“Where there is a discrepancy in wages and the employer offers its
established policy as an explanation, inquiry must focus on whether that policy has
been used reasonably in the case at hand, in light of the employer's stated purpose for
the policy and in light of the employer's other practices.”).
102
888 F.2d 322, 324 (4th Cir. 1989).
97
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determinations.103 In Rizo v. Yovino, the Ninth Circuit limited the
scope of the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense based on
the employer’s use of prior pay as a job-related factor.104
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit determined that although different
pay can be justified when it is based on certain affirmative
defenses, salary history is not a justification for different pay.105
Despite Corning, employers have continued to argue, and
courts have continued to accept, a “market forces” theory to justify
pay differentials. In Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit allowed an employer to take market forces into account
when using the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense.106
Notably, the court was aware that the market forces defense could
justify discrimination.107
Equally, some courts have narrowed and constrained the EPA
in ways that undermine its fundamental goals. Specifically, courts
have interpreted the EPA’s “factor other than sex” as inapposite to
the comparable Title VII “business necessity” standard. Some
courts allow unrestricted rationales—legitimate or not—for
“factor other than sex” defense.108
Courts avoid the EPA’s mandate of equal pay for equal work
and instead support an employer’s claim that a man’s greater
experience or education justifies a higher salary.109 In Boriss v.
Addison Farmers Insurance Company, an Illinois federal district
court improperly accepted the male comparators’ purportedly
superior qualifications as a “factor other than sex” without
justifying whether those qualifications were in fact necessary for
the job.110 In fact, at least two circuits have accepted the argument
that any “factor other than sex” should be interpreted literally and

103

Id. at 326.
950 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2020).
105
Id.
106
470 F.3d 685, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2006).
107
Id. at 697 n.6.
108
See Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir.1989) (“The fourth
affirmative defense (any other factor other than sex) is a broad ‘catch-all’ exception
and embraces an almost limitless number of factors, so long as they do not involve
sex.”).
109
Notably, the Ninth Circuit recently stated that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in
Fallon is an outlier, and that it could not “reconcile it with either well-settled rules of
statutory construction or the ‘broadly remedial’ purpose of the EPA.” Rizo v. Yovino,
950 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2020).
110
No. 91 C 3144, 1993 WL 284331, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 1993).
104
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that employers need not justify whether certain qualifications are
necessary for the job.111 .
The most egregious cases occur when the courts approve
“factors other than sex” arguments that seriously undermine the
stated principles of the EPA. Some courts have, for example,
authorized employers to pay male employees more than similarly
situated female employees based on the higher prior salaries
enjoyed by those male workers without any analysis as to whether
the prior salary itself was inflated because of sex discrimination.
In Sparrock v. NYP Holdings, Inc, a New York federal district
court dismissed the plaintiff’s EPA claim, holding that “salary
matching is permitted under the Equal Pay Act” because “it allows
an employer to award prior experience and to lure talented people
from other settings.”112 The district court ignored the evidence
that the male and female employees had similar experience and
qualifications for the position.113
Other courts have abandoned any effort to determine whether
the employer’s purported “factor other than sex” is in any way
related to the qualifications, skills, or experience needed to
perform the job. In Glunt v. GES Exposition Services, Inc., the
court approved offering a male employee a higher starting salary
and stated that “[o]ffering a higher salary in order to induce a
candidate to accept the employer’s offer over competing offers has
been recognized as a valid factor other than sex justifying a wage
disparity.”114 The court reasoned that “[i]t is widely recognized
that an employer may continue to pay a transferred or reassigned
employee his or her previous higher wage without violating the
EPA, even though the current work may not justify the higher
wage.”115 In Drury v. Waterfront Media, Inc., the court accepted an
argument that higher pay for a male comparator was necessary to
“lure him away from his prior employer.”116 The court emphasized
that “[s]alary matching and experience-based compensation are

111

See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“The disagreement between this circuit (plus the eighth) and those that required
an ‘acceptable business reason’ is established, and we are not even slightly tempted
to change sides.”).
112
Sparrock v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1776, 2008 WL 744733, at *15–16
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2008).
113
Id.
114
123 F. Supp. 2d 847, 859 (D. Md. 2000).
115
Id. (emphasis added).
116
No. 05 Civ. 10646, 2007 WL 737486, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2007).
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reasonable, gender-neutral business tactics, and therefore qualify
as ‘a factor other than sex.’ ”117 In fact, the Seventh Circuit went
a step further and held that it “does not require that the factor
other than sex be related to the requirements of the particular
position in question, or that it be a ‘business-related reason’[ ].”118
The uneven interpretation of the EPA’s “factor other than sex”
defense defeats the EPA’s intended impact as a vehicle for
addressing pay inequity. Reforms are crucial to implement the
statute as intended. Similalry, as discussed below, reforms are
also needed to Title VII to address the false dichotomy posed by
the statute for Black women and other women of color.
2.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

The outstanding issue involving Title VII and the racialized
wage gap is whether and how to use intersectionality theory.
Intersectionality posits that among a hetergenous group, there are
different experiences of discrimination and inequality.
Specifically, it espouses that the discriminatory wrong-doing
experienced by black women is both gendered and racialized.119
Yet, Black women plaintiffs claiming discrimination are limited to
bringing claims based on either race or sex in most jurisdictions.120
Title VII has a categorical framework that recognizes racism and
sexism. This protects Black men and white women from
employment discrimination but marginalizes Black women.121
Intersectionality within Title VII litigation has been difficult
to achieve. While Black women plaintiffs continue to present the
theory as the basis of a discrimination claim, courts have
continued to analyze the identities—race and gender—
separately.122 In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, five Black
women filed a lawsuit challenging the disparate impact of GM’s

117

Id.
Id. at 1211 (citing Covington v. Southern Illinois Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 321–22
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)).
119
Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 150–52.
120
Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1457–59 (2009) (study concluding that multiple claims are
not as successful as single claims).
121
See Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII,
14 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 21, 21 (1991) (“We are rarely recognized as a group separate
and distinct from black men, or as a present part of the larger group ‘women’ in this
culture.”) (citing BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN 7 (1981)).
122
Kotkin, supra note 120, at 1458–59.
118
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“last hired first fired” policy, which gave birth to claims of
intersectional discrimination.123 The trial court determined that
the plaintiffs could sue on the basis of race or on the basis of sex,
but they were not allowed to combine the claims.124 In rejecting
the claim of intersectional discrimination, the district court
reasoned that to combine claims would create a special subclass
beyond the scope of Title VII.125 The Eighth Circuit held that the
statute arguably allows plaintiffs to bring a claim based on only
one protected class, race or sex, thus, limiting the plainitffs’ ability
to expose the breadth and depth of their experienced inequality.126
The Fifth Circuit allowed a combined claim of race and sex a
discrimination in Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass’n.127 In
that case, which alleged disparate treatment, a Black woman
employed as a secretary, was denied several promotions within the
company.128 Instead of the plaintiff, a Black man and a white
woman were promoted.129 The district court found in favor of the
defendant employer.130 The district court found that plaintiff did
not meet her prima facie burden because a Black man and a white
woman had been promoted.131
In reversing the district court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit used
a “sex-plus” analysis.132 Applying this theory allowed the plaintiff
to bring a gender discrimination plus a race discrimination claim
based on a neutral factor.133
The court directly refuted
DeGraffenreid, saying, “the fact that black males and white
females are not subject to discrimination is irrelevant.”134 This
expansive view of Title VII is significant for Black women alleging
discrimination based on multiple identifiers. But the Jefferies
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413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
Id. at 143–44.
125
Id. at 143, 145.
126
558 F.2d 480, 484 (8th. Cir. 1977) (“We do not subscribe entirely to the district
court’s reasoning in rejecting [the Black women’s] claims of race and sex
discrimination under Title VII.”).
127
615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
128
Id. at 1029.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1030–31.
131
Id. at 1031.
132
Id. at 1033.
133
Id. (adopting the reasoning of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., where the
court found systemic disparate treatment claim based on a company policy that forbad
hiring women with preschool children. The discrimination category was sex. The
neutral category was having pre-school age children. 400 US 542, 544 (1971)).
134
Id. at 1034 n.7.
124
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court did not provide a framework for intersectional
discrimination cases going forward.135
Legal decisions that interpret the EPA and Title VII in ways
that foster discrimination and create unjust economic conditions
for Black women and other women of color are inconsistent with
the intent of anti-discrimination laws.
Thus, the gender
discrimination laws as implemented are ineffective. The next Part
critiques the racialized gender wage gap as a structure of
oppression and privilege by analyzing how neoclassical economics,
political invisibility, and cultural stereotypes promote rather than
eliminate it.
II. THE STRUCTURAL BARRIERS OF THE RACIALIZED WAGE GAP
Intersectionality is an inclusive concept for understanding
and contesting multiple oppressions.136 Using the theory to
analyze marginalization requires unpacking the particular ways
in which dominance and control are perpetuated and protected.
By examining the nuances of the intersecting identities, scholars
can interrogate the power structures that propagate oppression
and facilitate the discriminatory relationship between the
oppressor and the oppressed. Failure to segregate and separately
examine the underlying structures results in incomplete
knowledge about its effect, obscures the harm to the individual,
and hampers effectual dismantling.137 As discussed below,
neoclassical economic theory, political invisibility, and cultural
stereotypes and tropes each contribute to the perpetual existence
of the racialized wage gap.138

135
Angela Mae Kupenda et al., Political Invisibility of Black Women: Still Suspect
but No Suspect Class, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 109, 123–24 n.110 (2010).
136
See BARBARA SMITH, HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY xxxi (2000)
(Smith described the women’s liberation movement as “a movement committed to
fighting sexual, racial, economic, and heterosexist oppression, not to mention one
which opposes imperialism, anti-Semitism, the oppressions visited upon the
physically disabled, the old and the young, at the same time that it challenges
militarism and imminent nuclear destruction is the very opposite of narrow.”).
137
See McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 11, at 14–15 (arguing that failing to uncouple
and separately examine the theories that comprise intersectionality is “hegemonic
discourse,” but not an effective theory for social changes).
138
A review of the substantive law is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, the
discussion focuses on the economic principles that support discriminatory labor
practices.
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Economic Theory & the Racialized Gender Wage Gap

Law shapes the economy and economic principles shape the
law.139 Neoclassical economic theory is the predominant economic
model supporting the development of law. This economic analysis
of law examines issues from the perspective of marketplace
efficiency.140 An outgrowth of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand
theory, neoclassical economic theory eschews even “a minimum
level of governmental interference” or state intervention in
economic affairs.141
“Neoclassical economics describes the economy as a state of
equilibrium, in which the forces of supply and demand interact to
achieve optimal allocation of society’s resources.”142 Its axioms are
premised on “voluntary, informed, and rational (i.e., utility
Neoclassical
maximizing)” economic decision-making.143
economics models are also based on perfect competition.144 The
market fairly and efficiently allocates resources and achieves a
societal equilibrium as individuals make “self-interested economic
decisions.”145
Neoclassical economic models are centered around “systems of
generalizations.”146 This system “describes the relationships
among a range of stated variables,” and the analysis of these

139
DEBORAH M. FIGART & TONIA L. WARNECKE, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
GENDER AND ECONOMIC LIFE 1 (2013) (noting that “the economy is embedded in
society.”).
140
Law and economics is the academic school of thought that emanates from
neoclassical economics. See Paul G. Mahoney, Adam Smith, Prophet of Law and
Economics, 46 J. LEGAL STUDIES 207, 219–25 (2017); see also Jon Hanson & David
Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism,
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 139–47 (2003).
141
Adam Smith saw labor and market forces as inter-connected with the market
adjusting prices to reflect the value of the individual’s labor. Individuals exercising
self-interest devoid of political restrictions was in the best interest of the nation. See
RICHARD R. WILK & LISA C. CLIGGETT, ECONOMIES AND CULTURES: FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 49–52 (2d ed., 2007).
142
Charles R. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and
Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 540 (1998). See E. Ray Canterbery, THE MAKING
OF ECONOMICS 92–95 (1976). See also Kenneth M. Casebeer & Charles J. Whalen,
Taking Interdependence and Production More Seriously: Toward Mutual Rationality
and a More Useful Law and Economics, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 148–50 (2011)
(arguing that economic theory must be based on mutual rationality).
143
Pouncy, supra note 142, at 540.
144
Id. at 541. See JÜRG NIEHANS, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY 490–92
(1990).
145
Pouncy, supra note 142, at 541.
146
Id.
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variables can be used to predict changes in other variables.147 This
is particularly significant when discussing discrimination
considering two neoclassical economics principles. The first is the
axiom of static equilibrium, which means that the market
responds to external stimuli as necessary and achieves a new
equilibrium, a new resting point, repeatedly.148 The second is the
axiom that competitive economies eliminate discriminatory
wages.149
Theoretically, this means that over time race
discrimination should diminish.150 The ever-widening racialized
wage gap is an indication that the market has not responded to
the exogenic conditions that produce racialized economic
inequality. Income inequality and wage gaps, at every economic
level, continue to plaque the Black community
Neither of the neoclassical economics theories of
discrimination, statistical and taste, provide an adequate
explanation for the racialized gender wage gap. This is, in part,
because of the variables used in neoclassical economics to analyze
discrimination in general, and intersectional discrimination in
particular.151
The statistical discrimination model explains
employment outcomes based entirely on “rational expectations
equilibrium.”152 It equates employers’ beliefs about workers’ skill
levels with “the willingness to hire.”153 The employer then
determines the amount and degree of its human capital
investment based on its expectations.154 The employers’ selffulfilling, rational expectations determine workers’ actual skill

147
Id. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 4 (1953) (arguing
that economic models must respond to the realities of present conditions).
148
Pouncy, supra note 142, at 542.
149
Id.
150
See Lawrence E. Blume, The Dynamics of Statistical Discrimination, 116
ECON. J. 480, 480–81 (2006).
151
The omitted variable problem commonly raises an issue in statistical analysis.
A variable may not be included in the linear regression because it is unknown or not
available. Omitting a variable may lead to upward bias, if there is an over-estimation
or downward bias, if there is an under-estimation. See Jongbin Jung et al., Omitted
and Included Variable Bias in Tests for Disparate Impact, SHARAD GOEL 5 (Aug. 29,
2019), https://5harad.com/papers/included-variable-bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/LWK5FFCM]. Implicit statistical discrimination occurs when protected class variables, such
as race, gender, age, are excluded but other information that is highly correlated with
omitted characteristics, such as zip codes, or credit scores, are proxies for the relevant
factors. DEVIN G. POPE & JUSTIN R. SYDNOR, IMPLICIT STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
IN PREDICTIVE MODELS 1 (May 2007).
152
See Blume, supra note 150, at 480.
153
Id.
154
Id.
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levels.155 Whether these presumptions are correct or become “the
self-fulfilling prophecy” is the question that often is raised
regarding the phenomenon.156 Expectations often turn into reality
for no reason other than they were based on flawed, even biased,
selections.157
The employer’s system “can have multiple equilibria with
distinct employment and wage levels, each with correct
expectations.”158 When employment varies among groups, that
difference is explained by pointing to different equilibria.159 Yet,
there is no critical evaluation of the equilibria factors nor policy
employed when there is a poor or weak equilibrium.160
Critics of neoclassical economics reject the employers’ rational
belief of group low productivity. Instead, this result is explained
by human capital theory.161 Employers “learn” that they can pay
less-productive employers less. Alternatively, employers might
determine that the less-productive employees are productive. As
that information is disseminated in the marketplace, other
employers might hire the newly labeled, productive employees.162
Employers who did not ‘experiment and learn’ would be less
profitable, while those who take the risk of experimenting can pay
lower wages for the same quality of work.163
Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker developed the taste for
discrimination framework. Becker posits that discrimination
occurs when an employer is “willing to pay.”164
Taste
discrimination differs, however, because the employer is obviously
biased. Discrimination occurs when there is a preference to a
person with a particular characteristic, despite the equal or
superior qualifications of a less-desired person.165 If an employer

155

Id. at 485–86.
See Robert K. Merton, The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 8 THE ANTIOCH REV. 193,
196 (1948). See Blume, supra note 150, at 480.
157
Blume, supra note 150, at 495–96.
158
Id. at 481.
159
Id.
160
Gunnar Myrdal referred to an equilibrium of beliefs and behavior as “the
principle of cumulation” and as “the vicious circle.” See GUNNAR G. Myrdal, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 75–78 (1944).
He advocated for remedial policies that would destabilize one equilibrium in favor of
another one. Id.
161
See Blume, supra note 150, at 484–85.
162
Id. at 496.
163
Id.
164
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16–17 (1957).
165
Id.
156
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is prejudiced against a person of a specific race or sex, the question
becomes, how much more is the employer willing to pay to avoid
Wage discrimination is
hiring the less-desired person.166
sustainable in the presence of employers who prefer prejudice to
profits.167
Challenges to the neoclassical economics model are numerous
because of its impact on legal decision-making.168 To the extent
that the present economic models influence legal decision-making,
a critical assessment safeguards rather than limits employees’
economic choices instead of licensing employers’ choices that are a
pretense for illegal economic conduct. Moreover, legal rules need
to expand beyond economic rationality. Law has relied heavily on
rational-person economics in evaluating discriminatory conduct
based on the essential differences between men and women.
However, when making gender decisions law has not accounted for
the interdependence of social structures and human relationships.
In an effort to analyze the marginalization of women’s
economic contributions, economist Marilyn Power coined the term
“social provisioning.”169 Her sole objective was to broaden the
traditional market measures of work and its pecuniary value to
include those contributions that were either low wage or

166

Id.
See id. (describing the discrimination coefficient as a measure of the amount
an employer is willing to pay to exercise the employer’s prejudice).
168
The feminist challenge to neoclassical economics began with an examination
of the masculine biases in economic theory. See generally BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN:
FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds.,1993)
(a compilation of essays arguing that economics is based on subjective rather than
objective factors because its economic analysis is based on masculine assumptions.) A
later perspective argued that the feminist approach to welfare economic theory by
necessity incorporates social welfare functions that are important to women. See
Gillian K. Hadfield, Feminism, Fairness, and Welfare: An Invitation to Feminist Law
and Economics, 1 ANNUAL REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 285 (USC CLEO Research Paper No.
C05-15,
USC
Law
Legal
Studies
Paper
No.
05-22,
2005),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=846606 [https://perma.cc/8RNW-HF28] (challenging the
well-established notion that efficiency and income redistribution, the foundations
modern welfare theory, conflict with a commitment to fairness and to well-being.) A
more recent criticism of neoclassical economics developed from a collaboration of
European countries is even broader and focuses on the rights of lower-wage workers,
who often are women. See Johannes Dolderer et al.,, From Neoclassical Economics to
Common Good Economics, 13 SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2021), https://www.mdpi.com/20711050/13/4/2093/pdf [https://perma.cc/UEY2-2Z59] (described as an interdisciplinary
approach to economic theory designed to meet current economic, social and global
challenges).
169
Marilyn Power, Social Provisioning as a Starting Point for Feminist
Economics, 10 FEMINIST ECON. 3, 6–7 (2004).
167
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performed outside of markets.170 Power identified five categories:
(1) care work and unpaid labor; (2) well-being as economic success;
(3) race, ethnicity, and class classifications; (4) agency, individual
choice, and power dynamics; and (5) ethical goals and values that
require a critical analysis of their effect on economic markets.171
Specifically, she argues that a feminist economic perspective
would assign a quantifiable value to the effect of the category in
economic production and exchange markets instead of having the
economic effect go unmeasured.172 Eliminating these embedded
economic outcomes is essential to closing the racialized wage gap.
B.

Political Invisibility

Visibility is a power dynamic exercised by the dominant group
in a socio-political structure.173 It permits the dominant group to
determine the policies, procedures, and operations of institutions.
Political invisibility describes the obscurity of a citizen group when
societal institutions systematically deny a group social and
political rights.174 To be invisible in a society is to be politically or
economically powerless.175 The dominant group designates which
170

Id.
Id. at 9–10.
172
Id. at 7–15 . As one scholar argues, the Supreme Court frequently furthers
economic gender inequality by avoiding a nuanced examination of the economic effects
of the gender issues in favor of an over-simplified market approach. See Michele E.
Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 22 (2016)
(discussing recent Supreme Court decisions that failed to take account of the economic
impact of the legal rulings on women).
173
In an article contrasting visibility and invisibility within the work setting,
psychological researchers use the following definitions:
Visibility implies that individuals are perceived in a way they desire; in the
workplace, this might include being noticed for one’s skills and abilities,
rather than being categorized by others in terms of stereotypes about one’s
group. . . . We assert that for marginalized individuals, hypervisibility and
invisibility are contrasts to visibility and represent different manifestations
of the same oppressive forces – subjugation and devaluation. Both reflect
distortions of individuals and the groups to which they belong, and both
function to maintain a social hierarchy where marginalized groups are
constrained to the periphery.
Nicole Buchanan & Isis H. Settles, Managing (In)visibility and Hypervisibility in the
Workplace, 113 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 2–3 (2019).
174
See Kupenda et al., supra note 135, at 115 (discussing the political invisibility
of Black women and why they should be a suspect class under Title VII).
175
See Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place,
Asserting Our Rights, 24 C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 9–11 (1989) (describing the dual status
of Black women as creating a condition “which is more terrible than the sum of their
two constituent parts”); Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII,
Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
171
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groups are visible or invisible, excluding groups that are
designated as sub-human.176
In his acclaimed novel, Invisible Man, Ralph Ellison used the
concept of invisibility to describe how Black Americans as a race
feel in a society where their socio-political rights are denied.177
Although the invisible woman is a citizen living in a democracy,
she has limited choices and feels manipulated by the power
structures that control her existence. Ellison uses invisibility to
describe the relationship between an individual or group with the
power structure.178
Political visibility is synonymous with rights and power.
Societies create social contracts with their citizens as a way of
structuring order.179 As a result, citizens do not have to self-defend
against other citizens because they are protected by rules and
laws.180 John Locke’s notion of the social contract is well-known.181
To become part of a society, citizens permanently give up their
individual agency in order to receive the protection of their rights
79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 778–80 (1991) (discussing the economic fragility of women of color
in the labor market).
176
See Cassandra Jones Havard, Invisible Markets Netting Visible Results: When
Sub-Prime Lending Becomes Predatory, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1057, 1060–67
(2001) (analogizing Ralph Ellison’s notion of forced invisibility due to undemocratic
exclusion to the economic subordination that forced borrowers into predatory home
mortgage loans).
177
Addressing the spectrum of oppression and thus recognizing as visible those
who are otherwise treated as invisible, the narrator says: “I am invisible, understand,
simply because people refuse to see me. . . . When they approach me they see only my
surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination—indeed, everything and
anything except me.” RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 3 (Prologue, 2d Vintage Int’l ed.
1995). As one commentator notes:
[A] democracy is always pregnant with its contradiction.” This applies to the
Invisible Man, who lives in a democratic society but, in effect, has had very
little say in how his life has progressed. He has been shunted from one
circumstance to another, being controlled by those who are more powerful
than he and who forbid him from obtaining any real power of his own.
Marcy L. Tanter, Steal Away: How the Invisible Man Lights His World, 26 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 989, 994–95 (2001) (citations omitted).
178
Id. See ELLISON, supra note 177.
179
See generally Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51
FLA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1999).
180
The notion of a social contract is firmly planted in legal theory. See JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE,
ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 1–2 (Barnes & Noble Books ed.,
1962) (1690); see also Allen, supra note 179, at 33 (1999) (“The social contract
authorizes society to limit the liberty of persons who interfere with the very interests
whose protection motivates rational persons to consent by contract to collective
authority.”).
181
See Allen, supra note 179, at 2–11.
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and interests.182 An individual citizen enters into the bargained
agreement voluntarily because it enhances and secures freedom.183
But those who are deemed unworthy or relegated to a subordinate
position in the society are not offered the opportunity to become
protected members.184 Social contracts extend privileges only to
certain classes of individuals.44 Analyzing what it means to be
raced and gendered, Carol Pateman and Charles Mills explored
the notion of political exclusion and subordination based on the
social status of being human but not counted as a full person.
Carol Pateman expanded on Locke’s notion of the social
contract by offering a gendered critique of the agreement.185
Pateman argues that because of systemic sexism, the power
imbalance in existing societies exclude women.186 The everwidening racialized wage gap is an indication that the market has
not responded to the exogenic conditions that produce racialized
economic inequality.187 In regard to gender, the social contract
enshrines men’s superior political rights over women.188
Similarly, Charles Mills, in The Racial Contract, examined
the politics of dehumanization and exclusion with respect to
race.189 Using the thematic from Pateman’s work, he explores the
political power that the social contract gives to non-whites who are
typically marginalized and subordinated.190 Mills argues that the
racial contract underwrites the social contract and ensures that
non-whites are excluded or marginalized.191
Economic inequality—that is, the gender wage gap—ignores
the racial aspects of Black women receiving equal pay. Wage
inequality for women of color is even more pervasive regardless of
the industry, level of education, or experience.192 Political

182

See id. at 33.
See id. at 18.
184
See Berta Esperanza HernándezTruyol, Sex, Culture, and Rights: A
Re/conceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALBANY L. REV.
607, 615–16 (1997).
185
See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988).
186
Id. at 6, 52.
187
Id. at 88.
188
Id.
189
See CHARLES MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 6–7 (1997).
190
Id.
191
Id. 6–7, 120. Mills deconstructs and exposes the theories and moral
justifications that support the “nonideal polity” and European myth that non-white
people are savages born “unfree and unequal.” Id. at 5, 16.
192
NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, AMERICA’S WOMEN AND THE
WAGE
GAP
3
(Mar.
2021),
https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our183
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invisibility provides a framework for focusing on how different
forms of power articulate change in the life experiences of Black
women. Although not exclusive to Black women, systemic erasure
is an active choice to marginalize or ignore the experiences of this
group.193 The particularized harm of Black women goes
unaddressed and is subsumed among the remedies for the
dominat group, in this case, discriminated Black men and white
women. Consequentaly, the society deprives Black women of their
uniqueness, their authenticity, and obliterates their agency.
Systemic erasure evolves into invisibility.
For Black women, invisibility commonly means being
‘‘unnoticed” and having their voices going ‘‘unheard.”194 The
vulnerabilities that Black women face are significant to their lived,
American experience. Invisibility is an oppressive structure of
power and privilege that makes clear the racialized wage gap is

work/resources/economic-justice/fair-pay/americas-women-and-the-wage-gap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9WS-FGV9].
193
See generally, Kyle C. Velte, Straightwashing the Census, 61 B.C. L. Rev. 69, 90
(arguing that the undercount of SOGI in Census data undermines needed and beneficial
policy reforms). Census data is collected in part to ensure that policies fairly and
equitably serve the needs of all races and ethnicities. The Census collects specific data
on Black women. Yet, the political invisibility of poor Black women, in particular, shows
that policy reforms are not aimed at prioritizing thier economic needs given the
heightened risk of poverty due to the combined effects of race and gender. The 2019
Census poverty data shows that eighteen percent of Black women were living in poverty
and Black women who were working full-time were getting paid sixty-three cents as
compared to every dollar a white man made. Black women who are heads of households
continue to experience increased exposure to food insecurity and economic job loss
caused by the impacts of COVID-19, making them more vulnerable to inadequate living
conditions. CDF Staff, Breonna Taylor and the Invisibility of Black Women and Girls in
America, CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND (Sept. 28, 2020),
https://www.childrensdefense.org/blog/breonna-taylor-and-the-invisibility-of-blackwomen-and-girls-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/KWA7-J54G].
194
Psychologists have evaluated the invisibility of Black women in different
contexts. One study examined the social invisibility of Black women by testing if they
were noticed and heard in social settings. The results suggested that Black women
are more likely than Black men or white men and women to go unnoticed by others in
a group or social situation. A follow-up study showed that Black women were also
more likely to go unheard when contributing to a group conversation made up of a
largely white audience. See Amanda K. Sesko & Monica Biernat, Prototypes of Race
and Gender: The Invisibility of Black Women, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 356,
358 (2010). See also R. Simpson & P. Lewis, An Investigation of Silence and A Scrutiny
of Tansparency: Re-Examining Gender In Organization Literature Through The
Concepts of Voice and Visibility, 58 HUMAN RELATIONS 1253 (2005). The psychological
effects of invisibility for Black women are well documented. The lack of agency from
not being authentic results in emotional harm and stress. See generally PATRICIA HILL
COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (2d ed., New York: Routledge 2000).
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not inadvertent. Economic conditions are rooted in the design of
this country’s political and economic structure.195 Even in a
democracy, the political system adopts an economic order that is
imposed on its citizens. How those who are the most vulnerable
fare, socio-politically and economically, is dependent upon the
society’s rules and policies. Again, it is imperative to refer to the
neoclassical principle on the free market. In a free-market
economy, the accepted myth is that income inequality is selfderived.196 It is therefore politically acceptable to disregard the
economic conditions of those who are not economically prosperous.
Yet, the inequitable political system perpetuates the
socioeconomic wrongs underlying the economic exclusion by failing
to address them.197
If citizenship is defined as “membership in a political
community,” invisible people are either completely excluded from
citizenship or are, in effect, sub-citizens.
In this regard,
citizenship becomes exclusionary. When the social contract
systematically and arbitrarily deprives citizenship protections,
those individuals are deprived of the benefits and safeguards that
the society provides.
They are politically or economically
powerless populations and the society can ignore their needs with
nominal immediate consequence. The paradox for Black women is
that the gains made during the feminist and civil rights

195

Christina Pazzanese, How Political Ideas Keep Economic Inequality Going, HARV.
GAZETTE (Mar. 3, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/03/pikettys-newbook-explores-how-economic-inequality-is-perpetuated/ [https://perma.cc/P4FU-Q2QJ].
See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2019) (defining the
inequality regime as the justification [used] for the structure of inequality and also the
institutions—the legal system, the educational system, the fiscal system—that help
sustain a certain level of equality or inequality in a given society).
196
Sociologist Joel Rogers describes the organization of capitalist economies in
western counties as either “high road” or “low road.” In the New York Times 1619
Project, which examines the legacy of slavery in America, Rogers describes how today’s
economy is shaped by the era of enslaved workers and the financiers who profited from
them. See Matthew Desmond, In Order To Understand The Brutality Of American
Capitalism, You Have To Start On The Plantation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/slavery-capitalism.html
[https://perma.cc/RN35-SFY9]. According to Rogers and sociologist Erik Olin Wright,
the American economy is a low road capitalist economy, given the low wages paid to
unskilled workers to produce low-priced goods that sacrifice quantity for quality. Low
road capitalism fosters income inequality, furthering poverty. See JOEL ROGERS &
ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, AMERICAN SOCIETY: HOW IT REALLY WORKS 240 (2d ed., 2015).
197
See generally BUT SOME OF US ARE BRAVE: A HISTORY OF BLACK FEMINISM IN
THE UNITED STATES (Akasha Hull, Patricia Bell-Scott & Barbara Smith eds., 2015).
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movements for white women and Black men do not apply to Black
women; thus, the Black woman remains marginalized.198
Instead of hearing the Black woman’s political voice,
erroneous representations and negative characterizations become
substitutes for the Black women’s perspective. As a result, the
varied concerns among sub-groups of Black women are
homogenized, denying any Black woman agency, and making any
single concern an interchangeable option that the dominant power
addresses at its discretion. The next Section discusses cultural
stereotypes as a structural barrier to the racialized gender wage
gap.
C.

Cultural Stereotypes & Tropes

The Black women’s labor market history reveals deep-seated
race and gender discrimination. Commonly held myths and
stereotypes—Mammy,
Jezebel,
and
Sapphire—proliferate
profoundly negative images. These portrayals are harmful to both
the employer and the employee. Further, stereotypes of Black
women are harmful and provide a structural barrier to achieving
wage parity. The portrayals are belittling and undoubtedly
contribute to implicit bias about Black women. Many of the names
and images of stereotypical Black women continue to negatively
impact the way Black women are perceived in American society.199
One of the earliest images of a Black woman is of “Mammy.”200
The history of slavery, where Black women were expected to take
care of the slave owner’s children, contributed to the image of an
“ideal Black maternal figure.”201 Absolutely critical to providing
for the white family structure, Mammy raised and protected the
children, providing much order and balance in maintaining the
household.202 While Mammy was praised for her assigned role of
198
Adia Harvey Wingfield, Women are Advancing in the Workplace, But Women of
Color Still Lag Behind, BROOKINGS (Oct. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/essay/womenare-advancing-in-the-workplace-but-women-of-color-still-lag-behind/
[https://perma.cc/LX57-UNWH].
199
MELISSA V. HARRIS-PERRY, SISTER CITIZEN: SHAME, STEREOTYPES, AND
BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA 33 (2011) (“Mammy, Jezebel, and Sapphire are common
and painful characterizations of black women and . . . each has a long history in
American social and cultural life.”).
200
Id.
201
Kupenda et al., supra note 135, at 115 (2010); DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T I
A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 47 (1985) (“Mammy was the
woman who could do anything, and do it better than anyone else.”).
202
WHITE, supra note 201, at 47–48. “This, therefore, is the broad outline of
Mammy. She was a woman completely dedicated to the white family, especially to the
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carrying for and raising white children, little attention was paid
to the relationship she had with her own children, especially in
terms of whether as a “working mother” their needs were
adequately met. In fact, the welfare and care of Black children
Mammy is nurturing and
was generally disregarded.203
compassionate, though her influence and assertiveness may be
hidden.204
“Jezebel” refers to the “seductive, alluring, wordly, beguiling,
tempting, and lewd” Black woman.205 The persona is of one who
dominates, manipulates, and uses her curvaceous body to her own
advantage.206 This stereotype is based on “a misinterpretation of
African culture by whites brought about because of the tropical
dress and cultural dance of African women,” which was
misinterpreted as “lewdness” or “uncontrollable lust.”207 The
Jezebel stereotype was used to “justify the rape, abuse, and
economic exploitation of Black women.”208 Jezebel was “depicted
as a [B]lack woman with an insatiable appetite for sex . . . who was
not satisfied with black men. . . . [Thus,] white men did not have
to rape [B]lack women . . . [because they] desired sexual relations
with white men.”209
“Sapphire” is the loud-mouthed, angry Black woman. She is
a domineering female who emasculates men.210
She was
characterized as a strong, masculine workhorse who labored with
Black men in the fields or an aggressive woman, whose
overbearing nature drove away her children and partners.211 The
Sapphire stereotype, stoked by Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1965
widely circulated report on “The Negro Family: The Case for
children of the family. . . . The Mammy image is fully misleading as that of Jezebel.
Both images have just enough grounding in reality to lend credibility to stereotypes
that would profoundly affect black women.” Id. at 49.
203
Kupenda et al., supra note 135, at 115–16.
204
Id.; WHITE, supra note 201, at 48–49.
205
Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia, The Jezebel Stereotype, FERRIS
STATE UNIV., https://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/jezebel/ [https://perma.cc/R7MB-AGU5]
(last visited July 19, 2022). This is in contrast to the stereotype of white women as
“models of self-respect, self-control, and modesty.” Id.
206
Kupenda et al., supra note 135, at 115.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia, The Jezebel Stereotype, supra note
205.
210
Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia, The Sapphire Caricature, FERRIS
STATE UNIV., https://www.ferris.edu/HTMLS/news/jimcrow/antiblack/sapphire.htm
(last visited July 19, 2021).
211
HARRIS-PERRY, supra note 199, at 93.
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National Action,” is characterized as outspoken, tenacious,
emasculating, loud, brash, nagging, and acting outside her proper
role in society.212 The Moynihan Report framed Black women as
“uniquely aggressive,” which Moynihan used to claim that the
“black matirarchy” was the reason why Black people have not
achieved equality.213
Moynihan’s conclusions granted two
generations of conservative policymakers permission to imagine
poor Black women as domineering household managers whose
unfeminine insistence on control both emasculated potential male
partners and destroyed their children’s future opportunities.214
The Sapphire, or angry Black woman, stereotype held “ ‘Black
women responsible for power they do not possess, power that is, in
fact, being utilized in very real ways by members of other social
groups who can claim emotional innocence as they hide behind,
and persecute, [Black women].’ ”215
The Sapphire stereotype perpetuated the “Welfare Queen.”
Ronald Reagan is responsible for adding the “Welfare Queen” to
the vernacular.216 This was a way of demonizing those who were
on public assistance for long periods of time. The image depicts an
undeserving aid recipient getting rich on the backs of taxpayers;
many considered it a racist dog whistle exploited by politicians.217
Stereotypes are not only negative and inaccurate portrayals
of a group that implicitly create bias, they also create
hypervisibility. This occurs when members of marginalized
groups are under intense surveillance.218 Although visibility in a
work environment is usually positive, hypervisibility results in a
level of increased scrutiny that comes with judgements and often

212

Id.
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Gillian Brockell, She Was Stereotyped as “The Welfare Queen.” The Truth Was
More Disturbing, A New Book Says, WASH. POST (May 21, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/05/21/she-was-stereotyped-welfarequeen-truth-was-more-disturbing-new-book-says/ [https://perma.cc/4RGG-JQNN].
217
Jared Bernstein, After All These Years, “Welfare Reform” is the Same Racist
POST
(Jan.
8,
2018),
Dog
Whistle
it
Always
Was,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/01/08/after-all-theseyears-welfare-reform-is-the-same-racist-dog-whistle-it-always-was/
[https://perma.cc/4UYS-LM9C].
218
Buchanan & Settles, supra note 173, at 1, 2 (citation omitted) (“This
hypervisibility and perception of deviance lead marginalized individuals to
become the focus of increased surveillance from others.”).
213

676

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:641

negative perceptions.219 As one study reports, “for members of
marginalized social groups, negative stereotypes combine with
being marked as different to result in their being perceived
as deviant.” 220
There is “increased surveillance” and
intensified precautions about the employee’s performance.221
Under these conditions of hypervisibility, mistakes (real or
perceived) are used to confirm negative stereotypes, and
evidence that could counter negative perceptions is
minimized or held suspect (e.g., when the person does
superior work, dominant group members assume they must
have had help). Similarly, when individuals are hypervisible,
their personal identities are invisible as they are seen only in
terms of their marginalized group membership (e.g., being the
token person of color to represent diversity on a committee).222

Professor Paulette Caldwell described the scope of the harm:
Stereotypes and negative images of black women serve many
functions. They separate black and white women from each other
and limit all women’s choices by perpetuating competing
ideologies of womanhood based on race . . . . The black woman’s
invisibility serves to blind all women and all blacks to the
interactive relationship between race and gender, leads to the
development of legal theories and social policies directed at either
race or gender without fully considering the implications of such
theories and policies, and ultimately assures the perpetuation of
domination on the basis of race and gender for all women and
members of subordinated races.223

Stereotypes are a way to divert attention away from
discriminatory social and economic policies. Instead of changing
the conditions under which Black women are forced to work and
develop their economic security, a trope is used to hyperscrutinize
and possibly make negative judgements without a separate
evaluation of the individual on the merits. These cultural
stereotypes create a particularized vulnerability to certain kinds
of discrimination.

219
Id. “In its most benign definition, hypervisibility is simply the state of
being extremely visible, which can be positive for dominant group members (e.g.,
being extremely visible as a valued, active contributor to the workplace.)” Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 395.
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Reframing the government regulations to monitor employer
behavior more effectively is crucial to ensuring that Black women
and other women of color receive equitable pay and as a result are
able to have adequate economic security. Not only do neoclassical
economics, political invisibility, and stereotyping harm, subjugate
and injure Black women and other women of color, the negative
spillover effects impact their families, the communities in which
they live, and all women. Deconstructing the structural barriers
and the other hierarchies that support the racialized wage gap
requires changing the discourse from oppression to one of equity
and inclusion. As argued below in Part III, reforms, including
monitoring employers’ salary setting practices, are needed to
execute policies that are aligned with the legislative intent of the
statutes.
III. PROMOTING RACIALLY GENDERED PARITY IN THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE
The gender racialized wage gap is woven into the American
milieu.224 Admittedly, the American economic system was not
designed with women and Black employees in mind. The labor of
both groups was expected to remain unpaid. Yet, the American
economy will not grow without concentrating on the negative
economic phenomenon of wage inequity.225
Likewise, full citizenship rights, as envisioned by the passage
of the Nineteenth Amendment, requires addressing the political,
economic, and cultural structures that curtail the economic
security of Black women and other women of color. At its core, the
implication of addressing the racialized gender wage gap is the
stated recognition that women are not all equally situated and
therefore some measures will need to be customized to protect all
employees.

224
Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Pay Gap: Have Women
Gone as Far as They Can? 21 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 7, 9 (2007) (study found
forty percent of the overall gender pay gap is not explainable after controlling for
observable data for education, field of study, and occupation).
225
See Naila Kabeer & Luisa Natali, Gender Equality and Economic Growth: Is
There a Win-Win?, 2013 INST. DEV. STUD. 21, 34 (Feb. 2013),
https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp417.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WPD-VXWE]
(discussing how gender equity boosts economic growth).
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A long-standing critique of the feminist movement is that the
issues of white women dominate proposals for reform.226 Reform
efforts undertaken that disregard the multiple identities of women
may resolve the harms suffered by women who are privileged but
are less likely to meet the needs incurred by Black women and
other women of color. The reforms below focus on Black women
and women of color not in an effort to be divisive. Yet, to do so
acknowledges that addressing the concerns of those least
privileged inevitably addresses the concerns of those who are more
advantaged.
Quite simply, gender wage parity cannot be
accomplished by ignoring the distinction. Moreover, ignoring
unequal pay will result in more women who will need support from
the federal government during their retirement years.
The EEOC has acknowledged “intersectional discrimination”
as a valid claim.227 As the administrative agency charged with
enforcing Title VII and the EPA, the EEOC should provide more
guidance. The EEOC can implement the proposed measures that
shift salary decision-making into an equitable, transparent
framework.
One question to consider is how to incentivize employers to
instill fair and transparent polices that promote wage equity and
close the racialized gender gap. Incentivizing employers is crucial
to having them comply with the letter and the spirt of the law. To
address this pervasive problem, Congress should adopt incentives
for self-regulation by employers, such as pay transparency and
periodic pay audits, in exchange for certain affirmative defenses
in EPA litigation.
Eradicating race and gender-based economic inequality
requires the “disinfectant of sunshine.”228 Title VII policy should

226
Emilie Aries, The Imperative of Intersectional Feminism, FORBES (Aug. 30,
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emiliearies/2017/08/30/the-imperative-ofintersectional-feminism/?sh=6d655d2b1914.
227
EEOC Enforcement Guidance on National Origin Discrimination, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/eeoc-enforcement-guidance-national-origindiscrimination#_Toc451518804 [https://perma.cc/J849-7KHK] (“Title VII also
prohibits ‘intersectional’ discrimination, which occurs when someone is discriminated
against because of the combination of two or more protect bases (e.g. national origin
and race).”) (last visited July 17, 2022).
228
See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based
Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 958 (2011) (“With ‘sunshine’ as
a disinfectant, boards are encouraged to develop sound compensation structures and
award compensation consistent with job requirements and executive performance.”)
(citing LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1932)).
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require preemptive employer action through reporting
requirements.
Mandatory reporting would establish that
employees are paid equally, for the “skill, effort, and
responsibility” of the job.229 The reporting requirement would
oblige employers to establish useful salary information for
employees. It would also give employers a basis to explain
legitimate salary differentials.230 Employers would be more
careful to ensure that the wage offered was consistent with the
“skill, effort, and responsibility” and therefore be able to explain
any pay disparities between employees performing substantially
similar jobs, just as the EPA requires.231
First, outside the public sector, it is very difficult for an
employee to discover what her colleagues are paid. If one does not
know one is being paid less than one’s coworkers, it is impossible
to challenge any differential that exists.232 Transparent pay
systems would encourage employers to develop and explain to
employees the criteria on which compensation is based, and to
ensure that they can justify pay disparities. The regulatory
approach to pay discrimination should be more similar, at least on
a conceptual level, to that of executive compensation.233
A McKinsey report on promoting gender parity in the
workplace identifies best practices for increasing female
representation. Among its top recommendations is “tracking and
eliminating gender pay gaps.”234 Several European countries
including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany require
companies to report on gender pay gaps.235 Publicly reporting on
pay gaps and wage transparency can help companies reach these
goals.
As the administrative agency tasked with enforcing Title VII
and the EPA, the EEOC should provide more guidance to plaintiffs
229
Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal
Quest for Equal Pay, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 229, 264 (2012).
230
Id. at 263–66.
231
Id. at 264.
232
See id. at 260−97.
233
Id. at 258.
234
Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Promoting Gender Parity in the Global Workplace,
MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/organization/our-insights/promoting-gender-parity-in-the-globalworkplace# [https://perma.cc/GGU9-ML2D].
235
Maitane Sardon, EU Moves to End Gender Pay Gap With Transparency Rules,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2021, 2:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-moves-to-endgender-pay-gap-with-transparency-rules-11614887136
[https://perma.cc/H37UH9VN].

680

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:641

and to the courts on the intersectional discrimination framework,
including underscoring the significance of being a member of the
protected classes listed in Title VII.236 As this Article argues, the
rights and contributions of Black women are too significant for
their economic security to be ignored. Denying a plaintiff’s use of
an intersectional framework limits the possibility of her being able
to prove the extent of the discriminatory conduct.
Similarly, Title VII should be amended so that the word “or”
in the lisiting of prohibited categories does not cause so much
disagreement among courts and deter plaintiffs with multiple
identifiers from pursing their claims. This recommendation is
consistent with the statute’s legislative history.237 Courts appear
confused about the interrelationship between the categories listed
in Title VII. Each is a protected classification, and individuals
alleging discrimination should not have to choose between them.
The risks that allow the racialized wage gap to continue can be
mitigated through targeted action to help Black women and other
women of color earn the income that improves their financial
position and makes them economically secure. The proposed
reforms in policies and laws must change to correct the structural
inequities.

CONCLUSION
The colored woman of to-day occupies, . . . a unique position
in this country. . . . She is confronted by both a woman
question and a race problem, and is as yet an unknown or
an unacknowledged factor in both.
—Anna Julia Cooper238

The guarantee of economic equality for women across
opportunity and pay levels of employment requires identifying the
distinctive race, class, and gender issues that Black women and
236
The E-RACE Initiative (Eradicating Racism and Colorism from Employment,
EEOC https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-moves-to-end-gender-pay-gap-with-transparencyrules-11614887136 [https://perma.cc/6TN5-88VL] (last visited July 17, 2022).
237
Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral, Women of Color and employment
Discrimination: Race and Gender Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159,
172 (1993). Castro and Corral have suggested Title VII be amended to include the
phrase “or any combination thereof.” Id. Some scholars argue that Title VII was never
meant to be interpreted through a single-issue framework.
238
ANNA J. COOPER, A VOICE FROM THE SOUTH: BY A BLACK WOMAN OF THE
SOUTH 134 (The Aldine Printing House, 1892).
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women of color face. To do otherwise furthers employment
discrimination and perpetuates economic marginalization. Yet,
fundamentally, an intersectional approach will reduce genderbased employment inequities overall.
At its best, the goal of feminism is to represent all American
women.239 Greater inclusiveness is needed to achieve feminism’s
economic objectives. A justifiable anti-racist and anti-sexist
corrective acknowledges political and economic intersectionality
and, at a minimum, the dual subordination that Black women and
other women of color face in the labor market. Black women and
other women of color—although not privileged and invisible to the
larger society—a are a crucial, viable segment of the American
workforce. Tackling the racialized gender gap ensures that Black
women and other women of color are not excluded from the
American political economy, which is in the best interest of all
Americans.

239

As critics of feminism’s strategies have observed, the “goal of representing all
American women remains an elusive vision.” MYRA MARX FERREE & BETH B. HESS,
CONTROVERSY AND COALITION: THE NEW FEMINIST MOVEMENT ACROSS THREE
DECADES OF CHANGE 99 (Taylor & Francis ed., 2002) (1985) (critiquing polices and
approaches of the feminist movement).

